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Abstract
Enterprises, small or large, rely heavily on long-term ¯nancing arrangements to
fund their operations. However, it has proved di±cult for ¯nancial theory to justify
the use of long-term contracts when the manager has the ability to divert or manipulate
the cash °ows, and when it is prohibitively costly for a third party, such as a court, to
verify or prove any managerial wrongdoing. Why would investors enter into ¯nancial
contracts that extend beyond the life of the ¯rm's existing physical assets when such
contracts rely on the manager to make repeated investments during the life of the
contract? How can investors induce the manager to make these investments when such
investments cannot be contracted upon?
In this paper we show that with the appropriate design of the control rights longer-
term debt contracts can become sustainable. In particular, investors are willing to
hold long-term debt if they are granted (1) the right to dismiss the manager and to
take over the company as a going concern upon default; or (2) the right to dismiss
the manager and to extend the maturity of the debt in default. Interestingly, it is the
threat of dismissal that induces management to comply with the contract but it is the
investors' ability to extend the maturity of the debt in default that makes this threat
credible. Empirical evidence reported by Gilson (1990, 1993), Gilson, John and Lang
(1990), Franks and Torous (1993, 1994), Franks, Nyborg and Torous (1996), Franks
and Sussman (1999) supports our view that creditors' right to dismiss manager and to
take equity or to extend the maturity of the debt in default plays a key role in enforcing
the repayment of debt.
Once we established that long-term debt is sustainable, the natural question to ask
is whether investors would be indi®erent between long-term debt and outside equity
or whether they would prefer one over the other. Despite the strong similarity of
the control rights and the maturity of debt and equity, investors will not be indi®erent
between the two securities in our model. If a project can raise long-term debt it can also
raise outside equity but the reverse is not true: there are projects that cannot issue debt
but may still obtain outside equity ¯nancing. This is so because of the nature of the
control rights. Since debtholders have contingent control rights, they cannot exercise
control unless default has occurred. Hence, the manager can devise more pro¯table
default strategies by planning his default ahead of time and milking the assets prior
to default. Since contingent control rights allow the manager more opportunities for
wealth transfer from investors o® the equilibrium path than unconditional rights, long-
term debt contracts must o®er the manager substantially higher incentive payments in
equilibrium than equity. Thus, a project aiming to secure longer-term debt ¯nancing
must show evidence of higher expected pro¯tability than one seeking equity ¯nancing.
Keywords: security design, nonveri¯ability of cash °ows, managerial moral hazard,
control rights, maturity, managerial dismissal, long-term debt, outside equity, manage-
rial asset substitution.
JEL Classi¯cation: G34, L14
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1 Introduction
Enterprises, small or large, rely heavily on long-term ¯nancing arrangements to fund their
operations. However, it has proved di±cult for ¯nancial theory to justify the use of long-
term contracts when the manager has the ability to divert or manipulate the cash °ows,
and when it is prohibitively costly for a third party, such as a court, to verify or prove any
managerial wrongdoing.1 Why would investors enter into ¯nancial contracts that extend
beyond the life of the ¯rm's existing physical assets when such contracts rely on the manager
to make repeated investments during the life of the contract?2 How can investors induce the
manager to make these investments when such investments cannot be contracted upon? De-
spite substantial progress in research on the design of ¯nancial contracts (Townsend (1979),
Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Hart and Moore (1989, 1994, 1995), Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), BerglÄof and von Thadden (1994), and
Berkovitch and Israel (1996)), these questions remain largely open.34
1These two assumptions capture that (1) managerial e®orts which are di±cult to verify have a signi¯cant
impact on the ¯rm's cash °ows; and (2) the time limits investors face and the legal fees they have to incur
when they decide to challenge management in court are frequently beyond their reach.
2For a similar de¯nition of long-term debt see Myers (1977).
3In this paper we investigate the incentives of managers to make repeated investments during the lives
of long-term ¯nancial contracts. These incentives are important, since many of the long-term contracts
that are observed in practice extend well beyond the lives of the ¯rms' existing physical assets. In the
existing literature on short-term versus long-term debt (BerglÄof and von Thadden (1994), Hart and Moore
(1994, 1995)) the reinvestment problem does not arise, since these models assume that the maturity of (both
short-term and) long-term debt is exogenous and that it is shorter than the life of the ¯rm's assets.
4We use the term physical assets to distinguish between the equipment and the goodwill of the company.
Goodwill is a potentially long-lived asset whose value critically depends on the manager's actions. If goodwill
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When cash °ows are nonveri¯able, contracts cannot be written on cash °ows, since courts
cannot verify their true realization (Grossman and Hart (1986)). When management has the
ability to divert or manipulate the cash °ows, incentive contracts cannot work either (Hart
and Moore (1989)). The threat of liquidation can sustain debt contracts (Townsend (1979),
Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985)) but only with maturity shorter than the life of
the ¯rm's existing assets (Hart and Moore (1989), Fluck (1998)). In contrast, the threat of
dismissal can sustain outside equity with unlimited life (Fluck (1998)).
In this paper we establish that with the appropriate design of the control rights long-term
debt can become sustainable. Our starting point is the model of Fluck (1998). Recognizing
that in this model debtholders are limited to liquidate the ¯rm's assets, whereas equityholders
are allowed to dismiss the manager, the innovation in our model is to grant debtholders the
right to dismiss the manager in the event of a default. It turns out that alone this right
can only sustain perpetual bonds, but in combination with other control rights, it can also
sustain debt with prespeci¯ed maturity.
In particular, if investors are also granted the right to take over the ¯rm as a going concern
(take equity) upon default, then they are willing to write debt contracts with maturity longer
than the life of the ¯rm's existing physical assets. Similarly, investors are willing to hold
long-term debt if they are granted the right to dismiss management and the right to extend
the maturity of the debt in default. Interestingly, it is the combination of these rights that
makes the contract sustainable. The threat of dismissal induces the manager to comply with
is not properly maintained, it can be easily destroyed in a very short period of time. The question we ask
here is how can investors induce the manager to maintain the goodwill of the company when investments
cannot be contracted upon.
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the contract but it is the investors' ability to take over the ¯rm as a going concern or to
extend the maturity of the debt in default that makes this threat credible.
In practice creditors frequently exercise their dismissal rights in default. In a sample
of ¯nancially distressed companies, Gilson (1990, 1993) reports evidence that signi¯cant
changes take place in the management and the board of directors of these companies following
default. Gilson ¯nds that on average 54 percent of directors who sit on the board prior to
the onset of ¯nancial distress and 57 percent of the CEOs are replaced by the time their
¯rms emerge from bankruptcy or settle privately with creditors less than two years later.
Although the average age of departing managers is only 52 years, none of them hold a
senior management position at another exchange listed ¯rm during the next three years.
Consistent with our theory, Gilson's evidence suggests that debtholders use their dismissal
rights to induce the repayment of debt from managers.
In line with our theory, the debtholders' rights to take equity or to extend the matu-
rity of the debt also play an important role in Chapter 11, in private debt restructuring,
and in the UK bankruptcy procedure (Gilson (1993), Franks and Torous (1993, 1994), John
(1993), Franks, Nyborg and Torous (1996) and Franks and Sussman (1999)). One important
feature of Chapter 11 is that when the ¯rm enters the reorganization the maturity of the
debt is extended and all repayments of capital and interest are postponed until the reorga-
nization is complete. Under Chapter 11 the ¯rm's impaired debts are replaced with new
¯nancial claims (longer-term debt or equity) on the assumption that the ¯rm will remain a
going concern. In private debt restructuring creditors consent to reduce promised interest
or principal payments, extend the maturity, or accept equity securities in the ¯rm. The UK
bankruptcy is characterized by a great concentration of rights under a security called the
5
°oating charge. The °oating charge closely resembles to equity with full control. In default,
the °oating charge holder may appoint a receiver and take possession of the company. All
the authority of the manager and the board of directors passes to the receiver, who may
close the company, sell its assets and do as he wishes in order to repay the loan.
Gilson (1990) and Gilson, John and Lang (1990) report evidence that in practice creditors
frequently accept equity securities in default. In approximately three out of four ¯rms in
Gilson's (1990) sample, creditors receive signi¯cant blocks of voting stock under the ¯rms'
debt restructuring and Chapter 11 reorganization plans. On average banks receive 36 percent
and bondholders receive 33 percent of the ¯rms' common stock. In a number of cases, the
debtholders also appoint their representatives to the board of directors. In 74% of the ¯rms
in Gilson, John and Lang's (1990) sample of corporate workouts, creditors take new equity
securities. In 51.4% of the debt restructurings bank lenders receive equity in the ¯rm, while
holders of publicly traded debt are given equity securities 86.7 % of the time. Extensions
of debt maturity is observed in 49% of workouts. The evidence reported in Gilson (1990)
and Gilson, John and Lang (1990) supports our view that the creditors' right to take voting
equity or to extend the maturity of the debt in default plays a key role in enforcing the
repayment of debt.
In the second part of the paper, we focus on the choice between debt and equity. Once
we established that long-term debt is sustainable, the natural question to ask is whether
investors would be indi®erent between long-term debt and outside equity or whether they
would prefer one over the other. Given the strong similarity of the control rights and the
maturity of debt and equity, one would expect the Modigliani and Miller indi®erence result
to prevail. After all, the equivalent of a strategic default on the debt payment would be the
6
manager's failure to pay equilibrium dividends to equity, and in either case, the equilibrium
strategy would specify that investors dismiss the manager. Surprisingly, however, in our
model investors will not be indi®erent between the two securities. If a project can raise
long-term debt, it can also raise outside equity but the reverse is not true. This is so because
of the nature of the control rights. Debtholders have contingent control rights, so they
cannot exercise control unless default has occurred. Hence, the manager can devise more
pro¯table default strategies by planning his default ahead of time and milking the assets
prior to default. Since contingent control rights allow the manager more opportunities for
wealth transfer from investors o®-the-equilibrium path than unconditional rights, long-term
debt contracts must o®er the manager substantially higher incentive payments in equilibrium
than equity.5 Thus, a project aiming to secure longer-term debt ¯nancing must show evidence
of higher pro¯tability than one seeking equity ¯nancing.6
5In their study of managerial compensation and capital structure of ¯rms, Berger, Ofek and Yermack
(1997) report that managers enjoy more attractive compensation packages in ¯rms that use more debt
¯nancing. Since our theory implies that ¯rms that use long-term debt must o®er higher incentive payment
to managers than those that use outside equity, their ¯ndings are consistent with the thrust of our model.
6Since the seminal papers of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Smith and Warner (1979) and
Berkovitch and Kim (1990) the agency problem between managers and bondholders has been a central issue
in the corporate ¯nance literature. The manager may choose investments that bene¯t him at the expense
of creditors, or he may transfer wealth from debtholders by rejecting pro¯table investments. Examples of
managerial actions include risk-shifting (shifting into a riskier project with identical or lower net present
value), asset switching (failing to maintain the assets, or failing to buy proper insurance) and the e®ort
provision problem (when e®ort is costly the manager may pass up investment opportunities that are valuable
to the ¯rm but costly to the manager). For an interesting study on the impact of risk-shifting on optimal
design of claim structures when managerial investment policy is nonveri¯able see Nachman and Noe (1996).
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As a consequence, investors will not be indi®erent between debt and outside equity,
regardless of the maturity of the debt contract. There will be projects which cannot raise
long-term debt but may still obtain outside equity ¯nancing.7 These are projects with
relatively high cash °ow variability and/or relatively low expected pro¯tability. Consistent
with Barclay and Smith (1995), as ¯rms show higher pro¯tability, they can secure long-term
debt ¯nancing in our model.
Related literature discusses at least three ways for ¯nanciers to protect their investment
from strategic default by managers. A ¯nancier may rely on his reputation, on an ex-
ante commitment, or on his control rights to enforce his claim. A banker can establish a
reputation for penalizing entrepreneurs who fail to deliver. Building such reputation may be
costly for the banker himself in the short run, but will pay o® in the long run by changing
the expectations of future clients and thereby preventing strategic defaults. This strategy is
particularly suitable for a ¯nancier who has a recognizable presence but not suitable for a
bondholder who is just one of many unidenti¯able investors. Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor
7In the corporate ¯nance literature it has been frequently stated that equity is equivalent to debt with an
in¯nite payment since such debt contract would trigger immediate default. It follows from our theory that
this statement only holds in continuous time models i.e. in models where default occurs instantenously. In
discrete time models, in contrast, where the repayment of debt is due at a certain date in the future, the
manager can plan his default ahead of time and milk the assets prior to default. The debtholders recognize
this but they cannot prevent it, since their control rights can only be exercised upon default. This is true
regardless of the size of the promised debt payment. Since contingent control rights allow the manager more
opportunities for wealth transfer from investors o®-the-equilibrium path than unconditional rights, there will
be projects which can raise outside equity but cannot issue debt even by promising an in¯nite payment. As
a consequence, the two contracts will not be equivalent.
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(1993) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994a, 1994b) develop models in which banks bene¯t
in the long run from having well-established reputations.
A banker can also prevent strategic default by committing ex ante to re¯nance any
entrepreneur with good performance in the prior period (even if such re¯nancing would not
be subgame perfect ex post) but terminate funding if the entrepreneur has defaulted in
the prior period. While she may be tempted to terminate more projects ex post, the banker
would bene¯t from having made the commitment not to do so ex ante, since her commitment
will induce all the entrepreneurs to truthfully report their pro¯ts. Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990) present an optimal debt contract with these characteristics in a model where ¯rms
borrow and the design of the debt contract induces predatory behavior from rivals.
Alternatively, if investors hold control rights, then they can prevent strategic default
by threatening to dismiss the manager or liquidate the ¯rm. Thus, investors who cannot
build reputations or make commitments because they do not have a recognizable presence
on the market may still protect their investment with appropriately designed control rights.
Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Aghion and Bolton (1990),
Berkovitch and Israel (1996), Fluck (1998) and Myers (1998) developed models in which
investors enforce their claims by exercising control rights. Our paper belongs to this class of
models.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3.1,
3.2 and 3.3 we present three equilibrium designs of long-term debt. In Section 4 we discuss
the empirical implications of the contract designs. In Scetion 5 we compare the pro¯tability
constraints for long-term debt and outside equity. The conclusions are summarized in Section
6. The proofs of the propositions are contained in the Appendix.
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2 The Model
Consider a risk-neutral (entrepreneur)-manager who has no wealth and seeks ¯nancing for
a project from risk-neutral investors. Both the investors and the manager use the same
positive discount factor, ±; to value future payo®s, and both care only about monetary
payo®s. Investors are Bertrand competitors, willing to ¯nance projects if they break even.
The project yields a periodic operating cash °ow, ~v: We denote the cash °ow realization
at time t by vt. The cash °ow, ~v; is an i.i.d. random variable that takes on the values
v+x > 0 and v¡x > 0 with equal probabilities. The project requires an investment outlay,
I; and involves the operation of an equipment with economic life of two periods.
Each period, the manager can divert the cash °ows as private bene¯ts, and in each period,
investors and management both learn the true realization of the cash °ows. However, the
true realization of the cash °ows is assumed to be nonveri¯able by a third party, since
contracts written on cash °ows are prohibitively costly to verify in court.
2.1 Investment policy
The project can be repeated over and over again. As long as the project continues, the
manager can renew the equipment each period at some cost a = ±I1+± ; or alternatively, he
can divert a and raise new ¯nancing every two periods.8 The equipment can be periodically
8Worth mentioning that in our model there are projects that cannot raise long-term debt ¯nancing unless
the debtholders can induce the manager to periodically renew the assets. These are projects that are not
pro¯table enough to compensate the ¯rm for the excessive perks the manager consumed in the past at the
expense of the investment. Since in our model the cash °ows the manager has diverted are consumed right
away (see Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) for a discussion of this assumption), the equilibria in which the
manager periodically maintains the assets dominate all other equilibria in the sense of Gale and Hellwig
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renewed if all cash °ow realizations of the project exceed the cost of the renewal, that is, if
v¡x ¸ a: If a is spent at time 1 and 2 then further investment of I can be avoided. However,
if a is not spent at time 1 and time 2, then, unless I is invested, the assets cannot produce.
Investors know whether or not the equipment has been renewed. This managerial invest-
ment policy is also nonveri¯able for a third party, such as a court.9 As a general principle,
in this model only receipts of payments are veri¯able. We assume that the true realization
of all other ¯nancial and accounting variables are prohibitively costly to verify.
2.2 The debt contract
We de¯ne debt as a contract that grants investors a ¯xed periodic payment and contingent
control rights. The debholders' control rights can only be exercised in default, i.e. if the
manager has failed to make the agreed-upon payment.10 In default, (i) the debtholders can
(1985). For this reason, we will focus only on equilibria in which investors can induce the manager to renew
the assets each period and ignore the equilibria in which the manager revisits the capital market every two
periods. In Section 4 we will point out that if the manager can save the cash °ows that he diverted and
invest his funds into new assets every two periods, then the same incentive compatibility conditions that
induce him to periodically renew the assets will induce him to plow his funds back into the ¯rm every two
periods.
9As the following quote from Kahan and Tuckman (1996) (Page 16) illustrates, the managerial investment
policy is also di±cult to verify in practice. "Public indentures contain a covenant which requires companies
to keep their properties in working order and to make all necessary repairs...What constitutes "good working
order" and "necessary repairs" is nowhere speci¯ed.... [This covenant] further provides that "the judgement
of the Company" shall determine what constitutes good working order and what repairs are necessary. Given
the broad discretion a®orded to the company's management, the American Bar Foundation (1971) concludes
that "this [covenant] is not likely to have any play except under very adverse business conditions"."
10Alternatively, if some accounting variables were veri¯able in our model, then we could de¯ne default as
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forgive11 and extend the maturity of the debt, or (ii) they can dismiss the manager, and/or
take over the ¯rm as a going concern, or (iii) they can dismiss the manager and extend the
maturity of the debt12. These actions and their payo®-implications are described in details
in the next subsection.
A debt contract may be written with a prespeci¯ed maturity, T, or with inde¯nite matu-
rity. If T exceeds the life of the ¯rm's existing physical assets (in our model it is two periods)
then we call the contract long-term debt.
2.3 Outside equity
In exchange for an e®ective claim to the ¯rm's cash °ows net of the manager's private
bene¯ts of control and unconditional control rights { the right to dismiss the manager re-
gardless of the ¯rm's cash °ows or managerial performance { outside equity holders transfer
I to the manager. Equity is issued with inde¯nite life.13 The timing of the actions and the
associated payo®s for outside equity are described in the next subsection.
either failure to make payment or violation of a bond covenant. Our results are easily applicable to covenant
debt, since investors are frequently granted speci¯c control rights when a covenant is violated (Smith and
Warner (1979) and Kahan and Tuckman (1996)).
11In practice, creditors frequently forgive by waiving violations of covenants (Beneish and Press (1993),
Chen and Wei (1993) and Sweeney (1994)).
12In the corporate world when there is default, creditors obtain de facto veto power over any corporate
action (Amihud, Garbade and Kahan (1999)). In our model a de facto veto power is equivalent with taking
over the company as a going concern.
13Fluck (1998) established that when cash °ows are nonveri¯able and the manager has the ability to divert
or manipulate the cash °ows, then the only outside equity that is sustainable is of unlimited life. This is
because the threat of the manager's dismissal is not a credible threat when there is a prespeci¯ed expiration
date on equity but becomes a credible threat when the equity has inde¯nite life.
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2.4 The set of actions and payo®s
Figure 1 presents the set of actions and payo®s when investors have the contingent right
to dismiss management and take over the ¯rm as a going concern in the event of a default.
As long as the manager is in charge, he decides on the investment and makes payments to
investors. Investors receive pt; the (actual) payment on which the manager has decided and
the manager receives Mt = vt ¡ at ¡ pt or vt ¡ pt; depending on his investment.
If default occurs and the debtholders forgive the current payment and extend the maturity
of the debt by one period, then the remaining (T+1-t) payments are rescheduled to times
t+1,...,T+1.14
Alternatively, if the debtholders dismiss the manager upon default, then a new manager
takes charge and decides on the payments p^t and the investment a^t. The departing manager
receives no payo® and the investors bear c; the cost of replacing the manager.
If the debtholders take over the ¯rm as a going concern at the time of the default, then
from this date onward they will be holding unconditional control rights for the inde¯nite
future and they will have a claim to a fraction of the ¯rm's cash °ows. That is, they
will receive an equity stake in the company. We denote the discounted present value of
the debtholders' future payo® from the time they have taken over the company as a going
concern by Ep^
+
1¡± , which is equal to the value of the debtholders' remaining claim (or the value
of the ¯rm whichever is lower).
If the debtholders dismiss the manager but do not take equity in default, then they can
still reschedule the remaining (T+1-t) payments to times (t+1,...T+1) and they will hold
14Alternatively, if the debtholders forgive but do not extend the maturity of the debt, then they simply
agree to accept one less payment.
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unconditional control rights until the debt is paid o®.
Notice from Figure 1 that it is the manager who has the ¯rst-mover advantage in our
model of debt. This is so because investors have contingent control rights. Thus, they can
act only in the event of a default. But whether or not default will occur, it is determined by
the manager's prior choice of action (strategic default) and by the state of nature (liquidity
default).
By de¯nition, outside equityholders can act regardless of the manager's actions. Hence,
when equityholders ¯nance the project, they have the ¯rst-mover advantage: They can
dismiss the manager regardless of performance. When the project is ¯nanced by outside
equity the payo®s are as follows. As long as the manager is in charge, he decides on the
investment and makes payments (dividends) to investors. Investors receive dt; the (actual)
payment on which the manager has decided and the manager receives Mt = vt ¡ at ¡ dt or
vt¡ dt; depending on his investment. If the equity holders dismiss the manager, then a new
manager takes charge and decides on the payments d^t and the investment a^t. The departing
manager receives no payo® and the equityholders bear c; the cost of replacing the manager.
3 The Design of Long-term Debt
In this section we will show that with appropriate design, debt contracts with maturity longer
than the life of the ¯rm's physical assets are sustainable. We will derive three equilibrium
contracts. These contracts induce managers to make periodic debt payments in equilibrium
and to properly maintain the assets/goodwill of the company. All three are Pareto-optimal.
They involve no veri¯cation cost or deadweight loss in equilibrium and the only way to make
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one party better o® is at the expense of the other party. These contracts all rely on the
investors' right to dismiss management and their ability to extend the maturity of the debt
in default.15
It is straightforward to see that the right to dismiss the manager in default is not su±cient
to sustain a debt claim with T-period maturity. If the manager is going to be ¯red following
a default, then, depending on the discount rate and the pro¯tability of the project, it is in
his best interest to comply with the contract in the last period. After all, once the contract
expires, he will remain in charge and he can decide whether or not to continue the project.
Alternatively, if the manager is not going to be disciplined for defaulting in the last period,
then it is in his best interest to strategically default then. Similarly, the manager would not
divert the cash °ows in the second-to-last period (and in any of the preceeding periods), if
he knew he would be replaced following default. Otherwise, he would divert all the cash
°ows. Thus, if the threat of dismissal is credible, the manager will comply with the terms
of the contract.
However, when debt has a prespeci¯ed expiration date, the threat of dismissal is not
15Models in the earlier literature focused on three types of control rights: the right to liquidate the ¯rm's
physical assets, the right to stop future funding for managers and the right to dismiss the manager. This
literature has established that the investors' right to liquidate the physical assets of the company in default
can sustain one-period debt (Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Hart and Moore
(1989)) but cannot sustain debt with maturity equal or longer than the life of the ¯rm's physical assets (Hart
and Moore (1989), Fluck (1998)) and that investors' right to stop future funding for managers in default
can induce these managers to make the ¯rst payment on a two-period debt contract (Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990)). More recently, Fluck (1998) showed that the unconditional right to dismiss management can sustain
outside equity but only with unlimited life.
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credible. When dismissal is costly, debtholders will not discipline the manager in the last
period. This is so because with unveri¯able cash °ows, debtholders cannot recover the
missed payment from the manager. Thus, the manager will strategically default in the last
period. Recognizing that any incoming manager will default in the last period, debtholders
will discipline the manager neither in the second-to-last period nor in any preceeding period.
Hence, regardless of T ¯nite, the debt contract will unravel.
If, however, the debtholders' right to dismiss management is combined with (i) the right
to take over the ¯rm as a going concern (take equity) in default (section 3.1) or (ii) the right
to extend the maturity of the debt in default (section 3.2), or (iii) if the debt is written
with inde¯nite maturity (section 3.3), then the threat of dismissal can become credible. By
design, each of these contracts has inde¯nite maturity in default. Since it is the expiration
date that causes the unravelling of the contract, one way to design an equilibrium contract
is to allow investors to extend the maturity of the debt in default.
3.1 The right to take over the ¯rm as a going concern in default
In this section we will show that if the debtholders are given the right to dismiss the
manager and to take over the ¯rm as a going concern (take equity) in default, then the
threat of dismissal may become credible. When investors have the contingent right to dismiss
management and take over the ¯rm as a going concern, then the following strategy-pair, as
proved in Proposition 1, constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.
For the investors: (i) Investors replace the manager and take over the ¯rm in a strategic
default16 in period t and forgive him and extend the maturity of the debt in a liquidity default
16Note that this equilibrium does not specify any action for investors if the manager has paid the contrac-
16
in period t;17 (ii) If the manager has strategically defaulted in period t but he has not been
dismissed in this period and/or the ¯rm has not been taken over, then the investors will
dismiss him and will take over the ¯rm next period regardless of the payment made; (iii) If
the manager was dismissed in a liquidity default in period t or the ¯rm has been taken over,
then the investors will dismiss the new manager and will take over the ¯rm next period; (iv)
If investors have dismissed the manager and have taken over the ¯rm in a liquidity default
in period t, then they will replace the manager and will take over the ¯rm in any strategic
default thereafter and will forgive him and extend the maturity of the debt in any liquidity
default18 thereafter;19 (v) If there is a liquidity default in period t and investors forgive but
do not extend the maturity of the debt, then from then on (i) takes e®ect.
For the manager and the new manager: (a) If a (new) manager has not strategically
defaulted until period t, then he will not strategically default in period t; (b) if the manager
¯nds himself on the job immediately following a strategic default in period t, then he will
tually speci¯ed amount, since the debtholders hold contingent rights and therefore, they are not allowed to
take action unless default has occurred.
17Replacing the manager after a strategic default, but not replacing him after a liquidity default, dominates
any alternative equilibrium speci¯cation in the sense of Gale and Hellwig (1985). Investors' willingness to
forgive the manager in liquidity default is largely consistent with empirical evidence reported by Beneish
and Press (1993), Chen and Wei (1993) and Sweeney (1994).
18After the debtholders have taken over the company as a going concern, strategic default and liquidity
default are de¯ned as failure to pay equilibrium dividends for strategic and for liquidity reasons, respectively.
19In equilibrium, the choice of actions by the investors depends on the corresponding actions by the new
manager. Investors take di®erent actions in (iii) and (iv) because the new manager cannot tell whether a
default that preceeded his appointment was a strategic or a liquidity default. We impose this assumption to
be consistent with our earlier assumptions on what third parties know and what they do not know.
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continue to divert the cash °ows thereafter; (c) If the manager has been replaced in period
t but the company has not been taken over by the debtholders, then the new manager will
divert the cash °ows each period thereafter; (d) If the manager has been replaced in period
t and the company has been taken over by the debtholders, then the new manager will not
strategically default in the following period. 2
Interestingly, it is the combination of the debtholders' right to dismiss management and
their ability to take over the ¯rm as a going concern that makes long-term debt sustainable.
Having the right to dismiss the manager, investors can induce the manager to comply with
the contract and can prevent strategic default. It is, however, their ability to take over the
¯rm as a going concern for inde¯nite life that makes this threat credible. Having the right
to take over the ¯rm as a going concern for the inde¯nite future, investors are willing to
dismiss the manager in strategic default, since ¡c + Ep^ + ±Ep^+1¡± ; the going-concern value of
the ¯rm for investors if they dismiss management, exceeds zero, the going concern value of
the company for investors if they do not dismiss management. This is true regardless of the
maturity of the original debt contract.
The incentive compatibility conditions are presented below and in the Appendix. In-
vestors are willing to provide the necessary funds to the manager if they can recover their
investment. Formally, 8 0 · ¿ < T
Ep
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ ¸ I: (1)
The left hand side of the inequality shows the present value of the actual payments in-
vestors expect to receive along the equilibrium path, the right hand side shows the investment
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outlay the debtholders provide.
It is incentive compatible for the manager to comply with the terms of the contract if the
discounted present value of his future incentive payments in equilibrium exceeds the value
of the current cash °ows. That is, if 8 0 · ¿ < T
Mv+x + EM
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v + x; (2)
and
Mv¡x + EM
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v ¡ x: (3)
where Mv+x and Mv¡x are the equilibrium payo®s to the manager in case of no liquidity
default (good state) and in liquidity default (bad state), respectively. EM denotes the
expected periodic payo® the manager receives during the life of the contract. M1 is the
period-(T+1) discounted value of the manager's expected future payo®s after the contract
has expired.
There are two additional incentive compatibility conditions required for the manager.
When investors have contingent control rights, they can only discipline the manager upon
default. In particular, debtholders cannot replace the manager for failing to maintain the
¯rm's assets. Recognizing this, the manager can devise a two-step default strategy: in the
¯rst period he would make the contractual payment but would not maintain the assets and
would divert a: Then, he would divert all the cash °ows in the second period. Consequently,
for the manager to comply with the contract, it must be the case that in addition to (1),
(2), and (3), the following conditions also hold 8 0 · ¿ < T :
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Mv+x + EM
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ a+ ±v (4)
Mv¡x + EM
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ a+ ±v: (5)
The left hand sides of (4) and (5) show the payment the manager receives along the
equilibrium path, the right hand sides show the amount he can divert: the sum of the
investment in the current period and the present value of the expected cash °ows next
period.20
Proposition 1 summarizes the equilibrium contract described above. The proof is pre-
sented in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Investors are willing to hold debt with maturity longer than the life of the
¯rm's existing physical assets if they are granted the right to dismiss the manager and to
take over the company as a going concern upon default. 2
Section 3.2 The right to extend the maturity of the debt in default
The right to take over the ¯rm as a going concern is not the only right that can assure
the credibility of the dismissal threat. The manager can instead grant the debtholders the
20In our model we assumed that the cash °ows the manager has diverted are consumed right away. Notice,
however, that if the manager could save the cash °ows that he diverted and invest his funds into new assets
every two periods, then conditions (4) and (5) would assure the manager's willingness to plow his funds back
to the ¯rm. Since v ¡ x ¸ a (see basic model), therefore a+ ±a · a+ ±v; and ±I · a+ ±v: Hence, it follows
from (4) and (5) that ±Mv+x + ±EM
PT
t=1 ±
t + ±T+1M1 ¸ I and ±Mv¡x + ±EMPTt=1 ±t + ±T+1M1 ¸ I.
The last two inequalities guarantee that the the manager is willing to plow his funds back to the ¯rm.
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right to extend the maturity of the debt upon default. When they are granted this right,
the debtholders can extend the maturity of their contract every time default occurs. Thus,
they will be holding unconditional rights with inde¯nite maturity in default. These rights
can prevent the unravelling of the contract.
When investors are granted the right to dismiss the manager and extend the maturity of
the debt in default then the following strategy-pair, as proved in Proposition 2, constitutes
a subgame perfect equilibrium.
For the investors: (i) Investors replace the manager and extend the maturity of the debt
in a strategic default in period t and forgive the manager and extend the maturity of the
debt in a liquidity default in period t; (ii) If the manager has strategically defaulted in period
t but he has not been dismissed in this period or investors have failed to extend the maturity
of the debt, then the investors will dismiss him and will extend the maturity of the debt
next period regardless of the payment made; (iii) If the manager was dismissed in a liquidity
default in period t but the maturity of the debt has not been extended, then the investors will
dismiss the new manager and will extend the maturity of the debt next period; (iv) If there
is a liquidity default in period t and investors have dismissed the manager and extended the
maturity of the debt or they forgave the manager and did not extend the maturity of the
debt, then from then on (i) takes e®ect.
For the manager and the new manager: (a) If a (new) manager has not strategically
defaulted until period t, then he will not default in period t; (b) if the manager ¯nds himself
on the job following a strategic default in period t, then he will continue to divert the
cash °ows thereafter; (c) If the manager has been replaced upon default in period t but
the maturity of the debt has not been extended by the debtholders, then the new manager
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will divert the cash °ows each period thereafter; (d) If the manager has been replaced
immediately upon default in period t and the maturity of the debt has been extended, then
the new manager will not strategically default in the following period. 2
For this contract to be incentive compatible for the investors and the manager it must be
the case that (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) are satis¯ed. Proposition 2 summarizes the equilibrium
contract described above. The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 Investors are willing to hold debt with maturity longer than the life of the
¯rm's existing physical assets if they are granted the right to dismiss the manager and to
extend the maturity of the debt upon default. 2
3.3 Perpetual bond
Another way to make the dismissal threat credible is to issue a claim for inde¯nite life
(perpetual bond). Interestingly, this contract is sustainable even in the absence of any
recovery right. Investors are willing dismiss the manager in strategic default, since ±p1¡± ¡ c;
the value of their claim if they dismiss the manager, exceeds 0, the value of their claim if
they do not dismiss the manager.21
21Another contract with no recovery rights is presented in Bolton's and Scharfstein's (1990) model. In
their model of two period projects, the projects require new outlay each period. The only right the investors
have is to deny funding for the entrepreneur's next project. Since in the second period the project will be
over and the investors cannot enforce any payment from the managers, at the end of period 1 no investor
would provide new funding for any period-2 project. In equilibrium the investors and the entrepreneur agree
to a two-period contract in which the investors automatically provide the entrepreneur with new funds in
the second period (even though it is not subgame perfect for them to do so) unless default occurs in the ¯rst
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When the manager issue perpetual debt, the following strategies, as proved in Proposition
3, constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the manager will make periodic debt
payments and will properly maintain the ¯rm's assets.
For the investors: (i) Investors do not dismiss the manager at ¯rst and until no strategic
default occurs; (ii) In the event of a strategic default in period t, investors replace the
manager; (iii) If the manager has strategically defaulted in period t but he has not been
dismissed in this period, then investors will dismiss him next period regardless of the payment
made.
For the manager and the new manager: (a) If a (new) manager has not strategically
defaulted until period t, then he will not default in period t; (b) If the manager ¯nds himself
on the job following a strategic default in period t, then he will continue to divert the
cash °ows thereafter; (c) If the manager has been replaced upon default in period t and the
company has been taken over by the debtholders, then the new manager will not strategically
default in the following period. 2
For this contract to be incentive compatible it must be the case that
Mv+x +
±EM
1¡ ± ¸ a+ ±v (6)
Mv¡x +
±EM
1¡ ± ¸ a+ ±v: (7)
period. This contract will induce the entrepreneur to make payment at the end of the ¯rst period but he will
always default in the second period. In contrast to our model where dismissing the manager is costly for the
investors, in Bolton's and Scharfstein's model the creditors gain from denying funding for the entrepreneur
in the second period.
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also hold in addition to
±Ep
1¡ ± ¸ I: (8)
Mv+x +
±EM
1¡ ± ¸ v + x; (9)
Mv¡x +
±EM
1¡ ± ¸ v ¡ x: (10)
Conditions (6) and (7) capture the notion that the manager may start milking the assets
prior to default.
Proposition 3 summarizes the equilibrium contract described above. The proof is pre-
sented in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Investors are willing to hold a perpetual bond if they are granted the right
to dismiss the manager upon default. 2
4 Empirical Implications
The contracts described in Proposition 1 and 2 rely on the debtholders' right to take over
the ¯rm as a going concern in default and their right to extend the maturity of the debt,
respectively. These rights also play an important role in practice: in Chapter 11, in private
debt restructuring, and in the UK bankruptcy procedure (Gilson (1993), Franks and Torous
(1993, 1994), John (1993), Franks, Nyborg and Torous (1996) and Franks and Sussman
(1999)). Under Chapter 11 the ¯rm's impaired debts are replaced with new ¯nancial claims
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(longer-term debt or equity) on the assumption that the ¯rm will remain a going concern.
In private debt restructuring creditors consent to reduce promised interest or principal pay-
ments, extend the maturity, or accept equity securities in the ¯rm.22 In the UK, bankruptcy
is characterized by a great concentration of rights under a security called °oating charge that
closely resembles to equity with full control. In default, the °oating charge holder appoints
a receiver and takes possession of the company. All the authority of the manager and the
board of directors passes to the receiver, who may do as he wishes in order to repay the loan.
In line with our theory, in practice debtholders also rely on their dismissal rights to
induce the repayment of debt from future managers. In a sample of ¯nancially distressed
¯rms, Gilson (1993) ¯nds that on average 57 percent of the CEOs are replaced by the time
their ¯rms emerge from bankruptcy or settle privately with creditors less than two years
later. Although the average age of departing managers is only 52 years, none of them hold
a senior management position at another exchange listed ¯rm during the next three years.
Gilson's evidence indicates that dismissal is a credible threat: managers lose substantially
more than their current pay and perks when they are dismissed in corporate default.
It is interesting to compare the timing of the manager's dismissal in our equilibrium con-
tracts and in the di®erent restructuring procedures in practice. In the equilibrium strategies
in Section 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, the manager is dismissed upon default. This is very similar to
22In Gilson's (1990) sample of ¯nancially distressed ¯rms, in approximately three out of four ¯rms in the
sample, creditors receive signi¯cant blocks of voting stock under the ¯rms' debt restructuring and Chapter
11 reorganization plans. On average banks receive 36 percent and bondholders receive 33 percent of the
¯rms' common stock. In a number of cases, the debtholders also appoint their representatives to the board
of directors.
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the UK bankruptcy procedure but it di®ers from Chapter 11. In the UK receivership all the
authority of the manager and the board of directors passes to the receiver. In Chapter 11
the manager has the right to submit the ¯rst reorganization plan and he cannot be dismissed
until then.
The protection that Chapter 11 provides for the manager can easily be incorporated into
our equilibrium contracts by rede¯ning the equilibrium strategies for the investors in Section
3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. For example for Section 3.1 the new equilibrium strategy would specify: If
the manager has strategically defaulted in period t and ¯led for Chapter 11, then debtholders
will dismiss the manager and will take over the company as a going concern as soon as they
can, regardless of the plan submitted by the manager. This contract is also an equilibrium
contract in our model. But because investors do not replace the manager immediately in a
strategic default, this equilibrium is dominated by our original equilibrium in the sense of
Gale and Hellwig (1985). As a consequence, fewer projects can raise long-term debt when
the manager can enjoy the protection of Chapter 11.
There are three important conditions embedded in Proposition 1. First, debtholders
cannot be given more than the value of their remaining claim when they take over the
company. Otherwise, they would take over the company too often (even in the case of
liquidity default), and would thereby destroy the manager's incentive to comply with the
contract.
Second, if debtholders decide to take equity positions in the ¯rm upon default, then
they must be able to dismiss the manager regardless of how small their claims are. Hence
the equity contract that will take e®ect once debtholders have taken over the ¯rm will
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occasionally violate the one-share one-vote principle.23 A good example of such an equity
contract from practice is the UK receivership. As we mentioned before, the UK bankruptcy is
characterized by a great concentration of rights under a new security called °oating charge
which closely resembles to equity with full control. By construction, this equity contract
almost always violates the one-share one-vote principle.
Finally, it is worth to point out that the contract described in Proposition 1 potentially
relies on debtholders' willingness to take equity positions following a default. Therefore, this
contract cannot be held by investors, who are prohibited from taking equity positions in
¯rms.24
An interesting implication of all three propositions is that only projects with inde¯nite
growth opportunities can raise longer-term ¯nancing. The empirical evidence on the re-
lationship between growth opportunities and debt maturity is mixed. Smith and Warner
(1995) document that ¯rms with few growth opportunities use longer maturity debt. In
contrast, Stochs and Mauer (1996) report that the higher the market to book ratio is, the
longer the maturity of the ¯rm's debt. Since our paper is silent on the size of the growth
opportunities of the ¯rm, neither ¯nding is inconsistent with our model.
23This is equivalent of the creditors obtaining de facto veto power over any corporate action in default
(Amihud, Garbade and Kahan (1999), see also in footnote 12).
24The Banking Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. 24) prohibits US commercial banks to hold equity shares. An
important exception to this general prohibition is the authority of banks to take equity in corporate restruc-
turings. Nevertheless, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 prohibits banks from owning more than 5
percent of the voting stock in any nonbank company or from otherwise controlling an industrial ¯rm. They
can, however, jointly hold more than 5 percent. For an interesting study on the banks' willingness to take
stock in restructurings see James (1995).
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Our model also implies that the maturity of debt will be matched with the going concern
life of the company as opposed to the life of the ¯rm's existing physical assets. In particular,
the model implies that the maturity of the debt will be shorter than the going concern life of
the company. In practice, it is di±cult to estimate the going concern life of a company. One
interesting exception is the case of the UK's utilities. In the UK regulators sign operating
contracts with utility companies. These contracts give the companies the right to operate in
a region for a ¯xed number of years, typically four or ¯ve years. These contracts are useful
for our purposes because their length can be used as a proxy for the going concern lives
of these companies. Consistent with our theory, even though the utilities have relatively
long-lived physical assets, the maturity of their debt is not matched with the life of their
existing physical assets: it is matched instead with their going concern life, i.e. with the
duration of their operating contract (Mayer (1999)).
It is possible to extend the model to study risk-shifting by modifying the speci¯cation
of the investment policy as follows: "If a is not spent in period 1 and period 2, then with
probability (1 ¡ ²) the assets can not produce any cash °ows unless I is invested, but
with probability ² small, the assets can produce for another period. For a wide range of
parameter values the newly modi¯ed managerial strategy of skipping the investment and
milking the assets will have lower NPV and higher variance for the ¯rm than the strategy
of properly maintaining the ¯rm's assets. Hence, the new model is suitable for the study of
risk-shifting. It is easy to see that all of our results about the equilibrium design of debt
contracts and the corresponding pro¯tability conditions remain valid in the framework of
the new model. Nevertheless, the incentive compatibility conditions will turn into more
complicated expressions.
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5 Pro¯tability Constraints
Our next step is to assess whether investors are indi®erent between long-term debt and
outside equity or whether they would prefer one contract over the other. Since holders of
contingent rights cannot exercise control unless the manager has failed to make payment,
these contracts leave more opportunities for the manager to transfer wealth from investors
o® the equilibrium path. In particular, a manager planning to default could start milking the
assets prior to default.25 In our model the manager who plans to default in the second period
will choose to make the ¯rst payment, but at the same time will skip the investment and
will divert these funds in the ¯rst period. If this happens, then holders of contingent control
rights will have to wait until the second period to discipline the manager. Therefore, these
investors will capture less value in strategic default than will investors with unconditional
rights. As a consequence, there will be projects which can raise funds by issuing a claim
with the unconditional right to dismiss the manager but cannot secure ¯nancing by issuing a
claim with contingent right to dismiss the manager and to take over the company as a going
concern in default.
To see this, we compare the equilibrium strategies and the corresponding incentive com-
patibility conditions for long-term debt and those for outside equity. In case of equity ¯nance,
the following strategies for the equityholders and the managers constitute a subgame perfect
equilibrium.26
25Leland (1999) ¯nds that asset substitution is not an issue for the average ¯rm but becomes a severe
problem for ¯rms on the verge of default. Fluck, Holtz-Eakin, and Rosen (1997) report that before their
businesses fail entrepreneurs start withdrawing funds from their ¯rm at a much faster rate than investors.
26See Fluck (1998) for the derivation of this equilibrium.
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For equityholders: Equityholders do not replace the manager at ¯rst and until the man-
ager paid equilibrium dividends and properly maintained the ¯rm's assets each period. If
there is any deviation from the equilibrium, then they replace the manager next period.
For the (new) manager: Pay equilibrium dividends and maintain the assets each period.
If there is any deviation from the equilibrium, then divert the cash °ows for ever. 2
For outside equity to be sustainable it must be the case that
±Ed
1¡ ± ¸ I (11)
so that equityholders can recover their investment. Furthermore, the present value of
all future managerial incentive payments must exceed any realizations of the cash °ows.
Formally,27
Mv+x + ±
M
1¡ ± ¸ v + x; (12)
Mv¡x + ±
M
1¡ ± ¸ v ¡ x: (13)
The main di®erence between the equilibrium strategies and the incentive compatibility
conditions of debt and equity stems from the design of the control rights. While debtholders
have contingent control rights, i.e. they can only act if default has occurred, equityholders
27It is su±cient to focus on these conditions for the comparison of the two contracts. The proof of
su±ciency is straightforward by comparing the rest of the incentive compatibility conditions for debt (see
Appendix) and the remaining incentive compatibility conditions for outside equity (see Fluck (1998)) and is
therefore omitted.
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have unconditional control rights, that is they can dismiss the manager regardless of the
cash °ows.
In comparing debt with equity, we will focus on the perpetual bond from Section 3.3. In
contrast to outside equity, this contract is sustainable only if inequalities (6), (7) also hold
in addition to (8), (9) and (10). Recall that conditions (6) and (7) capture the notion that
the manager may start milking the assets prior to default.
Assuming that investors ¯nance the project if they break even, the inequality-triplets of
(1), (2), and (3), and of (8), (9), and (10) coincide in equilibrium. Consequently, if a project
can raise debt, it can also raise outside equity but not vice versa.
A comparison of these inequalities reveal that the choice between long-term debt and
outside equity depends on the right hand sides of the managerial incentive compatibility
conditions and, thereby, on v; x; and I; the variability of the cash °ows, and the pro¯tability
of the project. For reasonably high values of ±, two possible cases arise.28 In the ¯rst scenario
a+ ±v > v + x. In the second scenario v ¡ x < a+ ±v · v + x: In neither case, (9) and (10)
imply (6) and (7). Thus, for a wide range of parameter values, there are projects that cannot
raise longer-term debt but may still raise outside equity. This is so because the pro¯tability
threshold for securing longer-term debt is higher than for securing outside equity. These
projects have limited ¯nancing choice because of higher cash °ow variability (high x) or
lower pro¯tability (low v or high I).
Proposition 4 summarizes the ¯ndings on the availability of ¯nancing. The proof can be
derived from the steps outlined above, and therefore it is omitted.
28For very low ± there is also a third case: a+ ±v · v¡x: In this case, if a project can raise outside equity,
it can also raise debt and vice versa.
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Proposition 4 If the manager can ¯nance his project by issuing long-term debt, then he
can also ¯nance the same project by issuing outside equity, but not vice versa.
To illustrate Proposition 2 we present an example of a project that can be ¯nanced by
outside equity, but not by long-term debt.
Example:
Let v; the periodic expected cash °ows of the project, be 100; x; the standard deviation of
the cash °ows 15; and the investment outlay I = 150: Then, in the good state, the project
yields 115, and in the bad state, 85.
Suppose that the discount factor ± = 0:9: Given I and ±; a = ±I1+± = 71: After substituting
into (8), the expected payment on this contract is 17:29
In the bad state, the manager cannot make full payment: After renewing the assets, he
is left with only 85 ¡ 71 = 14; so the contractual payment should be set at 20 to assure
that investors recover their investment. The manager will default and will pay 14 in the bad
state, and as long as he pays 14; he is forgiven for his liquidity default. In the good state,
the manager pays 20 in equilibrium.
Correspondingly, the manager enjoys 25 in private bene¯ts in the good state and no
private bene¯ts in the bad state. Conditions (9) and (10) hold since substituting into (9)
and (10) gives us 132 > 115; and 112 > 85; respectively. But inequality (6) fails to hold
since substituting into (6) we get 132 < 160: Consequently, this project can be ¯nanced by
outside equity, but not by long-term debt. 2
29Similar calculations can be provided for debt contracts with maturity T. For these debt contracts the
periodic payments would be higher.
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Example 1 presents a positive net present value project that cannot raise long-term debt
but can raise outside equity. The reason is that this project is not pro¯table enough to
provide su±cient incentive payments for the manager to honor creditors' claim. If long-term
debt is ever issued, then the manager would ¯nd it optimal not to maintain the assets in
the ¯rst period when the cash °ow realization is high, and to strategically default in the
following period. Nevertheless, the manager can raise ¯nancing by issuing outside equity.
This ¯nding is consistent with empirical evidence that ¯rms are substantially larger when
they have their ¯rst public debt issue than when they have their ¯rst public equity issue
(Carey et al. (1993)).
Worth noting that as long as the investment policy is nonveri¯able, writing a covenant in
the contract cannot make it any easier for the manager to raise debt ¯nancing. In contrast,
if the managerial investment policy is veri¯able, then covenant debt will do just as well in
preventing wealth transfer by management as outside equity.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that the debtholders' right to dismiss the manager and take over the ¯rm
as a going concern in default can induce the manager to make repeated investments over
time and, therefore, it can sustain debt contracts with maturity longer than the life of the
¯rm's existing physical assets. Since holders of contingent control rights can only discipline
the manager upon default, long-term debt allows more opportunities for wealth transfer from
investors to the manager than outside equity. As a consequence, an entrepreneur who can
raise funds by issuing outside equity might not be able to secure ¯nancing by long-term debt.
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To the extent that more projects have access to outside equity than to debt ¯nancing, our
model is consistent with Stulz (1990), who ¯nds that outside equity has an advantage over
debt in alleviating underinvestment.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
To establish that the contract is sustainable we need to check whether (A) investors are
willing to ¯nance the project ex ante in exchange for periodic payments; (B) investors are
willing to keep the manager in liquidity default; (C) investors are willing to dismiss the
manager and take over the ¯rm in strategic default; (D) the manager is willing to make
payments and to periodically renew the assets if he has not strategically defaulted; (E)
the replacement manager is willing to make payments and periodically renew the assets if
investors have taken over the company at the time of his arrival and if he has not strategically
defaulted since; (F) the manager will keep diverting the cash °ows each period following a
strategic default; (G) the manager will divert the cash °ows next period if the ¯rm has been
taken over following a liquidity default; (H) the new manager will divert the cash °ows next
period if the ¯rm has not been taken over at the time of his arrival.
We will present the corresponding incentive compatibility constraints below.
(A) Investors are willing to ¯nance the project if (1) holds.
(B) Investors are willing to keep the manager and extend the maturity of the debt in a
liquidity default rather than dismiss him if 80 · ¿ < T
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T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿Ept ¸ ¡c+
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿Ep^t (14)
Investors will keep the manager and extend the maturity of the debt30 in liquidity default
rather than dismiss him and take over the company if 80 · ¿ < T
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿Ept ¸ Ep^
+
1¡ ± ¡ c: (15)
(C) Investors are willing to dismiss the manager, provide I and write a new debt contract
for the renewal of the assets and take equity in exchange for their remaining claim in a
strategic default at time ¿;31 rather than keep him and re¯nance the project or keep him
and do nothing if 80 · ¿ < T
¡I +
T+¿X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿Ep^t +
Ep^+
1¡ ± ¡ c ¸ ¡I; (16)
¡I +
T+¿X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿Ep^t +
Ep^+
1¡ ± ¡ c ¸ 0: (17)
(D) The manager is willing to make payments and to periodically renew the assets if
(2){(5) hold.
(E) The incoming manager is willing to make payments and to periodically renew the
assets if investors have taken over the company at the time of his arrival and if he has not
strategically defaulted, if
30If investors did not have the ability to extend the debt in default, then they would take over the company
in liquidity default as well as in strategic default.
31It is su±cient to consider only the two-step default strategy here, since this strategy makes the investors
worst o®.
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M^v+x + EM^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ v + x (18)
M^v¡x + EM^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ v ¡ x (19)
M^v+x + EM^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ a+ ±v (20)
M^v¡x + EM^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ a+ ±v: (21)
(F) Given that investors will dismiss the manager following a strategic default and will
keep dismissing him thereafter, the manager will keep diverting the cash °ows each period
following a strategic default since v + x ¸Mv+x and v ¡ x ¸Mv¡x:
(G) Given that investors will dismiss the manager if the ¯rm has been taken over following
a liquidity default, the manager will divert the cash °ows next period since v + x ¸ Mv+x
and v ¡ x ¸Mv¡x:
(H) Given that investors will dismiss the new manager if the ¯rm has not been taken over
following a default, the new manager will divert the cash °ows next period since v+x ¸ M^v+x
and v ¡ x ¸ M^v¡x: 2
Proof of Proposition 2:
To establish that this contract is sustainable we need to check whether (A) investors are
willing to ¯nance the project ex ante in exchange for periodic payments; (B) investors are
willing to keep the manager and extend the maturity of the debt in liquidity default; (C)
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investors are willing to dismiss the manager and extend the maturity of the debt in strategic
default; (D) the manager is willing to make payments and to periodically renew the assets if
he has not strategically defaulted; (E) the replacement manager is willing to make payments
and periodically renew the assets if he has not strategically defaulted; (F) the manager will
keep diverting the cash °ows each period following a strategic default; (G) the new manager
will divert the cash °ows if the maturity of the debt has not been extended by the time of
his arrival.
The corresponding incentive compatibility conditions are presented below.
(A) Investors are willing to ¯nance the project if (1) holds.
(B) Investors are willing to keep the manager and extend the maturity of the debt in a
liquidity default rather than dismiss him if 80 · ¿ < T if (14) holds.
(C) Investors are willing to dismiss the manager, provide I and write a new debt contract
for the renewal of the assets and extend the maturity of the debt in a strategic default rather
than keep him and re¯nance the project or keep him and do nothing if 80 · ¿ < T
¡I +
T+¿X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿Ep^t ¡ c ¸ ¡I; (22)
¡I +
T+¿X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿Ep^t ¡ c ¸ 0: (23)
(D) The manager is willing to make payments and to periodically renew the assets if
(2){(5) hold.
(E) The incoming manager is willing to make payments and to periodically renew the
assets if he has not strategically defaulted, if 80 · ¿ < T (18), (19), (20) and (21) hold.
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(F) Given that investors will dismiss the manager upon a strategic default and will
keep dismissing him thereafter, the manager will keep diverting the cash °ows each period
following a strategic default, since v + x ¸Mv+x and v ¡ x ¸Mv¡x:
(G) Given that investors will dismiss the new manager if the ¯rm has not been taken over
following a default, the new manager will divert the cash °ows next period since v+x ¸ M^v+x
and v ¡ x ¸ M^v¡x: 2
Proof of Proposition 3:
To establish that this contract is sustainable we need to check whether (A) investors
are willing to ¯nance the project ex ante in exchange for periodic payments; (B) investors
are willing to keep the manager in liquidity default; (C) investors are willing to dismiss the
manager in strategic default; (D) the manager is willing to make payments and to periodically
renew the assets if he has not strategically defaulted; (E) the replacement manager is willing
to make payments and periodically renew the assets if he has not strategically defaulted;
(F) the manager will keep diverting the cash °ows each period following a strategic default.
The corresponding incentive compatibility conditions follow.
(A) Investors are willing to ¯nance the project if (8) holds.
(B) Investors are willing to keep the manager rather than dismiss him if
1X
t=1
±tEpt ¸ ¡c+
1X
t=1
±tEp^t: (24)
(C) Investors are willing to dismiss the manager, provide I and write a new debt contract
for the renewal of the assets in a strategic default,32 rather than keep him and re¯nance the
32It is su±cient to consider only the two-step default strategy here, since this strategy makes the investors
worst o®.
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project or keep him and do nothing, if
¡I + ±Ep^t
1¡ ± ¡ c ¸ ¡I: (25)
¡I + ±Ep^t
1¡ ± ¡ c ¸ 0: (26)
(D) The manager is willing to make payments and to periodically renew the assets if (6),
(7), (9) and (10) hold.
(E) The incoming manager is willing to make payments and to periodically renew the
assets if he has not strategically defaulted, if
M^v+x +
±EM^
1¡ ± ¸ v + x (27)
M^v¡x +
±EM^
1¡ ± ¸ v ¡ x (28)
M^v+x +
±EM^
1¡ ± ¸ a+ ±v (29)
M^v¡x +
±EM^
1¡ ± ¸ a+ ±v: (30)
(F) Given that investors will dismiss the manager upon a strategic default and given
that if they failed to dismiss the manager in a strategic default right away, they will dismiss
him in the following period regardless of payment made, the manager who has strategically
defaulted will keep diverting the cash °ows each period thereafter, since v + x ¸ Mv+x and
v ¡ x ¸Mv¡x: 2
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